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In light of an ever growing gap between Israel‟s religious and secular 
communities,  it is perhaps inevitable that the phenomenon would come to capture the 
interest of Israel-oriented scholars. Yet efforts to address the extent to which religion 
affects the nature and operations of the Israeli army and the degree to which that 
influence is advantageous – or perhaps detrimental – have been far from comprehensive. 
A manifestation of the religious-secular conflict, the religious-military cleavage within 
Israeli society has long been at the heart of Israel-focused research. Scholars have 
remained intrigued by the conflicts that arise when a soldier‟s religious background is at 
odds with the inflexibility of army life. Many researchers have sought to measure the 
degree to which religion affects army cohesion and success in war, and determine 
whether or not religious influence on the State‟s force is largely harmless or a looming 
threat.            
 While scholars of both camps have posited credible theories crafted out of sound 
analyses, a review of selected scholarship on the subject suggests that the influence of 
religion on the Israeli military is benign. Opponents of religious influence on the military 
have failed to appreciate the benefits of integrating devout troops into the force and the 
successes of mediating mechanisms that have become instrumental to the IDF. Such 
mediators may have been implemented in an effort to accommodate religious soldiers, 
but the entire force has stood to benefit.  
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          The Influence of Religion on the Character and Conduct 
       of the Israel Defense Forces: A Review of Selected Works 
Chapter 1:  The Juxtaposition of religious Jewish groups and the military in Israel 
 
Israel-oriented academics have long been intrigued by the troubling yet 
fascinating issues that surface when a soldier‟s religious background clashes with the 
rigors of army life. The situation is all the more complex given the fact that Israeli society 
is not merely composed of hilonim, or secular Jews, and haredim, the ultra-Orthodox; 
rather, Israel is far more religiously varied. A slew of devout groups exist along the 
religious spectrum, among them the datiim, or Religious Zionists and the traditional 
masortiim. The ultra-Orthodox highlight the importance of enforcing a distinct separation 
from the other groups to maintain their traditions, while Religious Zionists and masortiim 
are more actively involved in Israeli society.      
 As passions surrounding the influence of religion have yet to be eased, it is 
perhaps inevitable that the issue would come to capture the interest of scholars who 
examine cleavages in Israeli society, among them Eyal Ben-Ari, Uri Ben-Eliezer and 
Yagil Levy. Many have sought to assess the extent to which religion affects army 
cohesion and success in battle, and determine whether or not this impact is largely 
innocuous or, in fact, threatening.        
 Yet while considerable scholarship on the subject has already been published, 
efforts to address the extent to which religion affects the nature and operations of the 
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Israeli army and the degree to which that influence is beneficial – or perhaps harmful – 
have been far from exhaustive. While no shortage of Israel-focused scholars have 
devoted a great deal of research to covering what has been termed the „religious-secular 
cleavage‟ in Israel and have covered the friction that arises between the nation‟s religious 
and secular citizens, which is amplified in an army context, there remains a scarcity of 
scholarship on the possibility of tension fueled by Israel‟s religious community 
transferring over and ultimately influencing the nation‟s military (Cohen, 173).   
 Not only has the issue remained unsettled; it has spiraled into a heated, polarizing 
debate. As rabbinic leaders use their position of authority in religious circles to affect 
Israeli policy and alter the strength and cohesiveness of the nation‟s force, the influence 
of religion on the Israeli army is bound to give rise to further deliberations among the 
State‟s policy-makers and military officers, and spark impassioned debate among Israeli 
soldiers and civilians, all of whom run the gamut in terms of adherence to religious 
convictions.           
 These circumstances are aggravated by the fact that Israel does not enforce a 
separation of religion and state and lacks a written constitution to formally curtail the 
influence of religious leaders on the nation‟s civil and military matters, which is likely to 
keep the relationship between religion and politics mired in controversy. In their 
coverage of the role of religion in local and national issues and the link between religion 
and politics in “Separation of Religion and State in the Twenty-First Century: Comparing 
the Middle East and Western Democracies,” authors Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler 
contend that “there is no agreement on the link between religion and democracy. Many 
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assume that the two are incompatible, yet many argue the opposite (Fox and Sandler, 
318). The degree to which the nation‟s religious camp has affected the Israeli army and 
the extent to which its prominence in the military has been advantageous or detrimental 
to military performance certainly warrants further study.     
 Given the divisive nature of the subject and the reality that there remains a lack of 
consensus on the issue, it is to be expected that scholars would posit – and defend – a 
host of positions that may clash with one another. Since various theories have been 
crafted on the basis of research and subsequent analysis, it is important to recognize that 
the positions of scholars across the spectrum are of merit and deserving of consideration. 
As research results can be interpreted and framed in a variety of ways, and scholars may 
choose to emphasize certain realities at the expense of others, it is natural to find a variety 
of opinions come to the fore. It is crucial to avoid wholly espousing the arguments of a 
single academic or group and subsequently disregarding those who have adopted 
deviating positions.         
 Yet while both camps retain strong arguments, and all claims should be 
acknowledged and evaluated, a review of selected scholarship on the subject suggests 
that the influence of religious values on the Israeli military is benign. Some scholars 
maintain that the impact of religion on the Israeli army is cause for concern, and their 
apprehension on the issue is certainly not unfounded – there is a growing gap between 
religious Israelis and their secular counterparts, and the religious-secular split in Israel 
may, in fact, be regarded as the most serious of the state‟s social cleavages – yet external 
religious influence on devout troops remains harmless and may even result in benefits for 
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the IDF as a whole. Critics may charge that religion has a detrimental influence on army 
cohesion, and have plausible arguments to boost the validity of their claims, yet the fact 
remains that their concerns have yet to prove warranted. The religious-military divide 
may indeed be urgent and deserving of greater attention, yet this finding does not mean 
that religion is bound to have a detrimental influence on the army, nor does it necessarily 
entail reducing the likelihood that the IDF will prevail in war.    
 Yagil Levy has expressed concern that appeasing smaller groups within the larger 
force will result in undermining the IDF as a major national symbol, and has emphasized 
the fact that the army runs the risk of having components of the force strip senior 
commanders of their authority to enforce discipline. While these arguments are certainly 
reasonable, Levy fails to acknowledge the fact that his concerns have hardly materialized. 
Not only have his concerns not panned out, but the scholar fails to consider the possibility 
that a willingness on the part of secular army officers to accommodate religious soldiers 
may stand to benefit both the devout conscripts themselves and the IDF at large.  
 The army does cater to smaller groups within the larger force and it is subservient, 
to an extent, to the mandates of mediating mechanisms such as the Garin program, but 
there is no indication that accommodating religious troops necessarily entails granting 
these soldiers an undue level of authority over secular soldiers. Not only have mediating 
mechanisms been beneficial to religious soldiers, allowing them to maintain their 
allegiance to both their rabbinic guides and to army commanders, but the army in its 
entirety has reaped their benefits as well. Students who took part in the midrashot have 
reported that their participation in the program better prepared them for service and 
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enabled them to cope with the challenges of army life. Midrashot students have 
developed into strong soldiers and, in particular, have become effective teachers in the 
army‟s education sector (Rosman-Stollman, 167).     
 A number of scholars who claim that religion ultimately has a threatening 
influence on the army fear that soldiers who prioritize their religious and ideological 
beliefs over their obligation to the military might – inadvertently or not – encourage 
dissension throughout their units. These critics fear that, should religious soldiers 
continue to value their personal beliefs over their duty to serve, the influence of religion 
on the character and conduct of the army might be even more harmful. In fact, Cohen 
introduces the possibility that religious troops may multiply so quickly to the extent that 
they might outnumber non-religious soldiers. Religious-oriented soldiers may find 
themselves in leadership positions that allow them to infuse Israel‟s security policy with 
their religious outlook. Yet as Ben-Eliezer has made clear in his research, the large 
majority of high ranking army officers are secular, and current trends indicate that this 
situation will remain true.         
 Cohen raises the possibility that devout troops may refuse to perform the demands 
made of them and may even rebel against their commanders. While this was a prospect 
with which secular officers had to contend, particularly during the Sharon administration 
when the disengagement plan was to be carried out, and it may have even been deemed 
quite likely that religious soldiers would act according to their convictions and not in line 
with army-mandated commands, the fact remains that this plausible outcome remained 
hypothetical and did not pan out. While a backlash on behalf of religious troops toward 
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proceeding with plans of disengagement had been anticipated – in fact, it was expected 
that an overwhelming number of devout soldiers would refuse to comply with the 
mission – and the concern was understandable, these fears proved to be unwarranted. The 
army‟s secular commanders did not have to worry about the increasing influence of 
rabbis who might encourage defiance on religious grounds. Some rabbis have actually 
become well-known for being adamant about avoiding acting in a manner that may 
weaken army cohesion (Cohen, 185). In fact, unjustified fixation on the potential for 
religion to cause harm to army character and success on the battlefield has diverted 
attention away from real, formidable sources of friction between religion and military 
service in Israel (Cohen, 175).        
 Despite the fact that the arguments of scholars in defense of religious influence on 
the armed forces appear stronger and able to withstand criticism leveled by detractors, it 
is nonetheless crucial to examine the core arguments of academics who maintain that 
religion is damaging to the IDF and a potential obstacle to successfully carrying out 
military operations. Stuart Cohen, a professor of politics at Bar-Ilan University in Israel 
and leading scholar in this camp, has published prolifically on the subject, authoring a 
number of books on the influence of religion on the Israeli army, among them The Scroll 
or the Sword? Dilemmas of Religion and Military Service in Israel and Militarism and 
Israeli Society.         
 Cohen argues that failure to acknowledge and sufficiently address this possibility 
was justified, perhaps as a way to guarantee that the army would not be influenced by 
conflicts of ideology. Yet while the involvement of the nation‟s religious soldiers was 
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largely unrecognized as of the mid 1980‟s, it is no longer common practice to ignore this 
sector of the army. The fact that the religious-secular divide in Israel has captured the 
interest of a slew of academics attests to the fact that differences between religious and 
secular troops have become more significant.      
 As Cohen notes, disparities among Israeli troops in terms of religious background 
tend to surface when they are drafted (Cohen, 174). Research conducted by Lipkin-
Shahak in the mid 1990‟s revealed that troops of less religious backgrounds are inclined, 
for the most part, to favor the welfare of the individual over that of the group and 
customary motivations to serve in the army (acting on one‟s patriotism and serving one‟s 
country) are no longer as highly regarded. Newer, more self-fulfilling motives are 
assuming greater importance for these soldiers.     
 Yet Cohen maintains that the influence of religion on Israeli soldiers cannot be 
overlooked. Those who attended religious high schools have exhibited a strong interest 
in, and dedication to, serving the Israeli community at large and do not seem to have 
demonstrated similar ulterior motives and self-interest for proceeding with army service. 
Cohen makes clear that while the tendency of Israel‟s religious women to dodge military 
service is not a new development – they were known to claim that they are excused from 
the responsibility to serve because of the terms of the 1953 National Service Law – the 
same does not apply to the nation‟s men. In fact, very few of the nation‟s religious men 
sought to delay army service, and they became, as Cohen put it, “a fully integrated 
component of the IDF” (Cohen, 174).      
 Signs of religious observance in the army environment are rather easy to spot. It is 
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not uncommon to see religious troops wearing kipot, and the number of kipot-wearing 
troops is particularly high among those who voluntarily committed to army service, and 
those in combat units. Not only has religion exerted a clear and undeniable influence on a 
number of Israel‟s soldiers, but its effect seems to have only increased since the mid 
1990‟s. As Cohen mentions, approximately thirty percent of the Israeli army‟s soldiers 
wear kipot and, since 1994, the number of religious graduates of the army‟s pilot training 
program has increased by more than fifty percent (Cohen, 175). 
While the contributions of religious troops cannot go unrecognized, the 
pervasiveness of religion in the force ultimately does more harm than good. 
Cohen concedes that religious soldiers have become a vital asset to the IDF, yet 
the scholar simultaneously notes that some characteristics of observant troops are 
troubling. As Cohen explains, it is possible a number of these religious conscripts retain a 
deep-seated connection to the notion of continued Jewish control over the West Bank; in 
other words, they may be unwilling to execute orders that call for the demolition of 
Jewish areas there. Yagil Levy argues that in the long term, the fact that the IDF had 
become entangled in devout groups was detrimental to sustaining the professional nature 
of the military as it oversaw the disengagement plan go into effect. It was crucial for 
religious leaders to recognize that maintaining the symbolic nature of the army was in the 
best interest of both the rabbinate and observant troops (Levy, 403). The scholar contends 
that a high degree of accommodation of smaller groups within the larger force will lead 
to the undermining of the IDF as a significant national icon. Levy also warns that the 
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army is quite vulnerable to the makeup of its units to the extent that its power to impose 
discipline is severely threatened. 
Should the IDF fall prey to the religious orientations of its senior officers, 
discord and rebellion within its ranks will only be encouraged, and the religious 
convictions of a small minority will ultimately polarize the army instead of making 
it more cohesive. 
Those who claim that religion ultimately has a threatening influence on the army 
fear that soldiers who prioritize their religious and ideological beliefs over their 
obligation to the military might – intentionally or not – provoke rebellion within the 
force. These critics fear that, should observant soldiers continue to hold their religious 
convictions in higher regard, they may weaken army unity. Opponents of religious 
influence on the army maintain that there remains a real, dangerous possibility that 
religious troops may soon outnumber secular soldiers and find themselves in senior 
positions that allow them to instill their religious outlook into Israeli security policy.
 Although the religious community is undoubtedly entitled to its own opinion 
regarding the effectiveness of adhering to Jewish texts and religious tradition, Cohen has 
the upper hand here as he points out that Israel‟s religious leaders represent a rather small 
community, “a point of view shared by only a minority of the Israeli population at large” 
(Cohen, 395). The scholar‟s clarification here begs the question: Why should members of 
a minority group be able to exert unrestrained influence disproportionate to their 
numbers?          
 Yagil Levy echoes these concerns. The scholar makes clear that while the nature 
of army conduct is bound to be affected by the backgrounds of its recruits – their personal 
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convictions and ulterior motives could interfere with overriding military initiatives - the 
overarching goal of the Israeli military is not to advance the particular interests and views 
of this sector of the army; rather, the army‟s objective is to focus on the successful 
execution of operations that are for “the benefit of the national community as a whole” 
(Levy, 385).          
 In a similar vein, Levy warns of what might result should the interests and values 
of a segment of the army – perhaps those of the religious contingent - assume a greater 
degree of importance disproportional to the number of soldiers who harbor such 
sentiments. The scholar warns of the „civilianization of the army,‟ „subjective control‟ in 
which these smaller groups scrutinize army operations with their particular interests in 
mind, and the „demise of the military‟s professional identity‟ should this happen (Levy, 
386).           
 Yet despite the undeniable problems that arise when religious and secular soldiers 
come together for the first time in an army setting, Ben-Eliezer‟s counter-argument is 
airtight; the scholar maintains that fear of religious recruits filling senior military 
positions and disproportionally representing themselves among officers, exerting an 
excessive influence on the army and dominating the general staff is unwarranted and not 
grounded in fact (Cohen, 193). As the scholar acknowledges, the large majority of senior 
army officers are secular, and recent research suggests that this military make-up will 
remain (Cohen, 193). 
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Conceding to the army’s religious troops raises the possibility that observant 
soldiers may refuse to proceed with orders that clash with their religious 
convictions. 
Cohen makes clear that the religious community‟s adherence to the army and the 
expectation of military service is “by no means assured” (Cohen, 182). The potential of 
religion to inform the makeup of the Israeli army is indisputable. As Cohen explains, the 
number of religious Israeli men of army age who claim to be excused from mandatory 
service since they have dedicated their professional lives to Torah study is astronomically 
high, and as many as eighty percent take this stand (Cohen, 187). Interestingly, these 
devout individuals maintain that their devotion to the Torah is every bit as valuable to 
Israel‟s security as military action.        
 Cohen maintains that the dedication of Israel‟s religious soldiers to military orders 
hinges on whether or not they believe that the army acts in accordance with “the religious 
Zionist understanding of security” (Cohen, 183). The scholar makes clear that, in the 
event that soldiers deem military commands to be counter to the religious Zionist 
outlook, the troops may be reluctant to carry out the demands made of them and perhaps 
rebel against their commanders. Not only is this plausible; Cohen argues that it is, in fact, 
quite likely that these soldiers may act on their convictions. The possibility that they 
would act in this manner has been increased as the strong sense of unity and camaraderie 
among the nation‟s religious troops would facilitate such behavior. Cohen brings a sense 
of urgency to this reality through citing a series of grave historical examples. Perhaps the 
most well-known in recent years was the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin 
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in November 1995 - a murder carried out by an ardent, religious individual outraged by 
“treacherous withdrawals from Israel‟s God-given inheritance” (Cohen, 184).  
The Israeli army, further segregated on account of religious influence on the 
force, deviates markedly from Ben-Gurion’s vision of an integrated army unaffected 
by religion. 
It is interesting to note that while Ben-Gurion was adamant about fostering a 
unified army that lacked divisions along religious lines, Cohen points out that many 
observant troops are inclined to somewhat segregate themselves from their secular 
counterparts and form smaller groups within the larger force. As these groups are said to 
be more conducive to Orthodox Jewish practice, many religious soldiers have 
demonstrated a preference for serving within such homogeneous collectives as opposed 
to serving „as individuals in the IDF as a whole‟ (Cohen, 194). Cohen argues that, should 
current trends continue and the religious community works to cordon itself off from the 
rest of the force, the IDF will no longer be the “people‟s army” it was intended to be. As 
Cohen aptly put it, instead of the army serving as a powerful “nation builder,” it may 
evolve into a “nation divider” (Cohen, 195).      
 Cohen‟s reference to Ben-Gurion‟s mission ever since the establishment of 
Israel‟s armed forces raises critical questions regarding whether or not there can be a 
clear and complete separation between army and religion. As Cohen explains, Ben-
Gurion‟s aim from the outset was to have the nation‟s army serve as a vehicle for Jewish 
nation-building (Cohen 190). The scholar also clarifies that Ben-Gurion effectively 
prevented the creation of distinct army units for observant soldiers. Ben-Gurion was, in 
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fact, unyielding in his position on the issue. He feared that the designation of particular 
military units for religious soldiers could breed anti-religious sentiment throughout the 
force and run counter to the overarching goal of creating a unified army. Ben-Gurion 
maintained that the most appropriate course of action is to train army officers to 
demonstrate respect for devout troops.       
 Yet while Ben-Gurion spoke of the conditions favorable to creating a united army 
devoid of religious-secular tension, Cohen argues that this ideal has hardly materialized. 
The scholar claims that religious and secular troops have become „increasingly 
segregated‟ (Cohen 191). Perhaps due to the varying environments from which these 
troops came, it has become more difficult for religious and secular conscripts to suddenly 
come together and work alongside one another in the army. 
Despite the constructive outcomes of mediating structures, the religion-
military clash has been exacerbated by recent political developments. 
Though the tension that arises when religious values and army life coincide is 
nothing new – in fact, it has always been a feature of the army - it remains a problematic 
reality that continues to provoke a backlash from the religious and non-religious alike. In 
recent years, the competing influences have surfaced to the extent that they no longer 
affect minor issues and few members of the force. The issue has become more developed 
and further complicated to the point that the conflict has come to affect issues of 
considerable importance to far more people – to the nation‟s secular and religious 
communities. As Cohen explains, relations between the religious and secular camps in 
Israel have been characterized as „increasingly ferocious‟ as their views differ on a wide 
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range of issues. The situation is aggravated by the fact that the religious have become 
increasingly politically powerful since the decline of the Labor Party (Cohen, 177). Not 
only has Israel‟s religious community acquired greater political and demographic weight; 
the nation‟s secular and religious are inherently at odds in terms of their values and ways 
of life. As a result, opportunities for reconciliation and compromise have shrunk.   
 Cohen also addresses the plight of political leaders of the settlement communities 
that constitute the West Bank - many of whom happen to be of a religious background – 
and notes that, while this is not the norm among them, they have at times been rather 
vocal in expressing their criticism of IDF conduct. These local leaders allege that a 
number of army commanders have inadequately dealt with Palestinians who have 
attacked Jewish homes and land. After the failure of the Oslo Accords, some of these 
leaders – albeit a small fraction of them – supported the concept of potential new 
conscripts avoiding military service by claiming conscientious objection.   
Earlier research may have revealed a benign influence of religion on the IDF, 
but it is imperative to reexamine dated studies and subsequently revise previous 
scholarship.  
While Cohen has written extensively on the clashes that surface when tensions 
between Israel‟s religious camp and the nation‟s secular community flare up in a military 
context, his research published in Armed Forces & Society certainly merits a closer look. 
Cohen‟s recent work on the influence of religion on the IDF reveals a deviation from 
analyses conducted decades earlier. As the scholar explains, studies conducted in the 
early 1980‟s suggested that the impact of religious influence on Israel‟s force was 
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overwhelmingly positive. In fact, Cohen goes so far as to claim that coverage of the topic 
could have ended on “an affirmative note” (Cohen, 392). Discourse on the subject would 
have undoubtedly been “celebratory in tone,” conveying an “overall picture of harmony,” 
citing the capacity for Jewish convictions to “inject an ethical code of conduct into the 
IDF‟s corporate behavior, thereby moderating the brutalizing influences that military 
frameworks, by the nature of their purposes, often exert” (Cohen, 392).  
 Yet Cohen emphasizes the fact that research conducted in Israel far more recently 
– a mere eleven years ago as opposed to nearly thirty years prior – unveils a vastly 
different picture of the nation‟s religion-military relationship. Cohen stops short of 
claiming that previous studies are no longer valid, yet makes clear that at the very least, 
updated data demand a review and subsequent revision of earlier work. The scholar 
argues that research recently conducted suggests an enlarged gap between religious 
Israelis and their secular counterparts. Not only do these studies reveal a widening rift 
between these two communities, but Cohen demonstrates the urgency of the situation, 
claiming that the religious-secular split in Israel is regarded as the most serious of the 
state‟s social cleavages (Cohen, 393).       
 Cohen appears to have rather harsh words to describe the newfound influence of 
religion on the character and makeup of Israel‟s armed forces. While religious values 
may have functioned as “homogenizing catalysts” in the past, mitigating differences in 
background and custom between secular and religious soldiers as they converge, likely 
for the first time, for service in the IDF, the scholar strongly conveys the message that the 
previously held notion of “an overall picture of harmony” is a thing of the past, no longer 
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a fitting description of current circumstances. Cohen maintains that differences between 
Israel‟s religious and secular communities have only become more pronounced in the 
army setting and have resulted in “the corrosion of religion as an agent for institutional 
cohesion” (Cohen, 394).       
 Cohen‟s research also implies a direct relationship between the religious-secular 
division and youth, a finding which is certain to have profound implications for the 
Israeli military, which drafts Israeli eighteen year olds for a period of two to three years 
(Cohen, 387). The scholar offers two explanations for his data that point to a break from 
earlier trends. Cohen cites the widening cultural distance between the state‟s religious 
school systems and the secular national ones, and points to differences in lifestyle 
between religious and secular youth. Recently collected data reveal that religious Israeli 
youth today abide by traditional norms more closely, which has led to a rise in the 
number of citizens who identify themselves as ultra-Orthodox. In fact, Haredi 
communities have grown dramatically since the state‟s establishment in 1948. As their 
representation in the Knesset has increased from five seats in 1951 to fourteen in 1996, 
the Haredim today enjoy far more political clout than they did in the past (Cohen, 395). 
Yet the degree to which secular Israeli youth remain loyal to Jewish values is declining 
(Cohen, 394).          
 While there remains merit to the arguments of deviating scholars, who maintain 
that religion continues to have a benign, advantageous effect on the IDF, and perhaps 
Cohen should have addressed his detractors, the scholar‟s claims are nonetheless on solid 
ground. Not only does Cohen endow recent trends with a sense of urgency demanding 
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greater attention; he identifies the problematic circumstances that have emerged as a 
consequence of increasing numbers of Israelis self-identifying as Orthodox: non-service, 
segregated service and conditional service. As Cohen explains, Israel‟s most devout 
citizens have historically encouraged resisting the draft, emphasizing the fact that Jewish 
law demands preventing women from serving and that rigorous study of Jewish texts 
does far more than battle to defend Israel (Cohen, 394-395).     
While the refusal of the ultra-Orthodox to serve in the army may not pose a 
numerical problem for the IDF – the military can draft new immigrants to fill its 
ranks – the symbolic importance of the Orthodox objection to serve has affected 
how their secular neighbors have perceived them and, consequently, has further 
soured religious-secular relations.  
Cohen makes a surprising conclusion regarding the significance of high rates of 
non-enlistment so often found among Israel‟s religious communities. While increasing 
numbers of Orthodox residents would be expected to pose a problem for the army, the 
scholar does acknowledge that because of the large waves of immigration to Israel from 
Ethiopia and the former Soviet Union, the issue of religious citizens seeking exemption 
from service is not as pressing as one may assume for a nation that must sustain a strong 
army to ensure its continued existence. While this may be true, the concession seems to 
weaken Cohen‟s argument. Yet the tendency of the devout to seek exemptions from 
service is not to be disregarded; as Cohen addresses, there is considerable symbolic 
significance here. Observant Israelis continue to strictly adhere to the terms of Jewish law 
while the majority – secular Israelis – continues to consider army service as the most 
important way to serve the state.       
 18 
 Despite changing opinions among Haredim with regard to army service, most 
deem military involvement to be a danger to their community and to the Jewish tradition. 
While some Haredim do complete army service today - their numbers tend to be higher in 
army units that are religious and service-oriented – most Haredim are excused from 
serving. Interestingly, a number of Haredi leaders believe that it is necessary to abstain 
from military service in order to ensure that Haredi values and practices are sustained.
 Yet their exemption from army service has provoked a backlash by those who 
perceive the situation in an entirely different light. Many of Israel‟s more secular citizens 
find that the Haredi refusal to serve is anti-Zionist. In fact, a number of individuals who 
oppose exemption for the religious have actively demonstrated against its continuation. In 
essence, high rates of exemption from service among the religious have not helped to 
mend the divide between the nation‟s religious and secular communities that has only 
grown in recent years. As Cohen put it succinctly, “their nonservice has helped to 
stimulate societal contention” (Cohen, 396). The images Cohen puts forth of young 
secular Israelis who devote substantial time to serving in the army and then being on 
reserve duty powerfully draws allies to the secular camp; it is easy to identify with 
secular Israelis who serve and examine the religious community from their perspective. It 
is to be expected that secular soldiers would come to harbor feelings of resentment 
toward their Haredi counterparts who do not recognize this national duty. Clearly, while 
religion may have previously served as a cohesive agent in the army, abridging the gap 
between devout and secular soldiers, mandatory army service remains a point of 
contention between the two camps, and friction on this issue has only been aggravated. 
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Chapter 2: Fear of religious-oriented officers exerting influence beyond their 
numbers may be justifiable, yet the fact remains that plausible effects of a more 
religiously guided force are mere hypothetical scenarios that have yet to occur.  
Perhaps it is to be expected that conflicts between religion and military service 
which arise in an army context will likely be all the more explosive given the restrictive 
nature of the military as a national institution (Cohen, 176). Yet while these possibilities 
are certainly not far-fetched and should be acknowledged as plausible outcomes of 
increasing religious influence on the army, Cohen provides a strong counter-argument to 
those who fear the military will succumb to the influence of national religious troops: 
these potential outcomes remain hypothetical and have yet to materialize. In fact, 
preoccupation with these concerns has meant that insufficient attention has been paid to 
other sources of friction between religion and military service in Israel (Cohen, 175). 
 Cohen notes that it is unlikely that the large majority of religious troops will 
refuse to proceed with a demanded withdrawal from parts of the West Bank, and the 
army‟s secular commanders do not have to worry about the increasing influence of rabbis 
to encourage defiance on religious grounds. In fact, some rabbis have even become well-
known for their vocal opposition to, as Cohen put it, “any action which might impair the 
unity of Israel‟s armed forces” (Cohen, 185).      
 Like Cohen, Levy also addresses the notable increase in religious soldiers, a trend 
that has been documented for nearly thirty years (Levy, 133). While Cohen briefly 
mentions the hesderim – schools that were created to accommodate religious troops as 
they allowed for simultaneous Torah study and army service – Levy elaborates on this 
explanation and claims that many rabbis had initially expressed concern that exposure of 
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devout soldiers to the secular nature of the army would ultimately harm them. As the 
number of religious soldiers increased following the First Lebanon War, their rabbinic 
guides eventually assumed greater authority and found themselves in a position to consult 
with army officers to wield even more influence on the nature and conduct of army 
operations.          
 As Levy explains in his article, “The Embedded Military: Why did the IDF 
Perform Effectively in Executing the Disengagement Plan?” the process of 
disengagement – implemented in the summer of 2005 under the Sharon administration 
which entailed the Israeli military-led removal of Jewish settlers residing in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip – provides a relatively recent prime example of religion‟s potential 
to influence the course of military operations.      
 Levy acknowledges that the initiative was carried out smoothly and efficiently, 
yet emphasizes the reasons for this success; the army was able to ensure unity among its 
soldiers and evade religious troops‟ refusal to follow through with army commands 
(Levy, 382). As the scholar clarifies, the possibility of devout soldiers refusing to act on 
officer-instructed orders to implement disengagement was a reality with which 
commanders had to contend since a number of religious conscripts‟ political views were 
closely aligned to those of the settlers. Interestingly, a backlash on behalf of religious 
troops toward proceeding with plans of disengagement had been anticipated – in fact, it 
was expected that an overwhelming number of devout soldiers would refuse to comply 
with the mission – yet these fears proved to be unwarranted. Levy argues that the Israeli 
army was able to successfully complete the disengagement process since it effectively 
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limited the influence of its religious servicemen on army operations and, as Levy aptly 
put it, “reinforced the army‟s status as an apolitical and universal people‟s army” (Levy, 
382).  
Despite the clear advantage of curbing the influence of religion on the IDF, 
the benefits derived from incorporating religious soldiers cannot be disregarded. 
 The positive attitude toward military service as exhibited by the nation‟s more 
religious troops has been beneficial to the army at large, as they have given the force, as 
Cohen phrased it, „a particularly cohesive pool of high-quality and highly motivated 
manpower” (Cohen, 175). Levy highlights the advantages of integrating religious troops 
into the army and delineates the benefits of their service. As Levy explains, a number of 
devout soldiers, primarily from mainland Israel and the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
settlements, had begun to fill high-ranking army positions and solidify their status in the 
military by the end of the 1990‟s.       
 Recruiting these soldiers was conducive to fulfilling army goals. Drafting them 
not only increased military strength; these troops were also dedicated to serving in the 
army and were motivated, as Levy put it, by their „ethno-national ethos‟ (Levy, 392). 
Interestingly, Levy argues that assimilating devout soldiers into the fabric of army life 
ultimately aided the military in achieving its main political objectives and fending off 
anticipated protest. Army commanders actively recruited soldiers who exhibited a sincere 
commitment to the military and sought to do so „without mobilizing their civilian 
networks to protest against the army” (Levy, 392). The scholar cites the outcome of the 
al-Aqsa Intifada as a clear example of the effectiveness of recruiting religious soldiers.
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 Levy proceeds to claim that not only did religious soldiers enhance the army, but 
the conscripts themselves also stood to benefit. Levy maintains that it is best to consider 
the enlistment of observant troops as the beginning of a contract; under the terms of this 
contract of sorts, recruits are obliged to serve the national community and make personal 
sacrifices in pursuit of this goal, yet in the process they attain the power to ideologically 
influence the army and perhaps diminish its secular nature. As the scholar makes clear, 
these soldiers could envision their army service as an undertaking to defend Israel‟s 
borders, an outlook that jives well with military ambitions. 
The army is a ‘greedy institution’ that seeks to hold a grip on its soldiers and 
curtail the impact of competing influences. Mediating structures allow devout 
soldiers to serve without compromising their religious practices. Such mechanisms 
benefit not only religious troops, but the force as a whole. 
Cohen makes clear that the Israeli army seeks out „hegemonic loyalty‟ and aims 
to diminish the influence of outside forces that affect the conduct and allegiances of its 
soldiers. Many religious troops experience difficulty accepting this demand, firmly 
believing that the army must cater to their religious backgrounds and practices. For 
example, many observant troops insist on retaining the right to access non-military 
appointed rabbinic guides.         
 Based at Bar Ilan University, Elisheva Rosman-Stollman cites the work of Lewis 
Coser, a sociologist who labeled the army and religious leadership “greedy structures” 
that seek to lay claim to an individual‟s “loyalty, time, and attention” (Rosman-Stollman, 
159). In an effort to capture this among new troops, these so-called „greedy structures‟ 
demand that their members abide by certain standards of behavior which, according to 
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Rosman-Stollman, ultimately require soldiers to discard external commitments that 
similarly vie for their attention (Rosman-Stollman, 159).     
 The scholar explains that while such structures aim to monopolize one‟s loyalty, 
the reality is that most people across the globe – not only Israelis – are affiliated with 
multiple „structures,‟ namely various religious groups, the army, among others. 
Consequently, it is challenging for any of these structures to completely retain one‟s 
loyalty. In light of this, mediating mechanisms come into play, allowing several 
structures to operate simultaneously and have overlapping members. In effect, these 
mediators serve to mitigate friction that may develop between troops and the overarching 
structures to which they may be loyal (Rosman-Stollman, 160). For instance, should a 
soldier pledge loyalty to a religious group as well as to the army, a mediating structure 
would intervene, as it would likely be in an ideal position to resolve the problem of 
conflicting allegiances.         
 Though the research interests of Elisheva Rosman-Stollman coincide with those 
of Levy – both scholars evaluate the extent to which religious convictions have 
permeated army life and influenced the nature and course of army operations – they 
diverge on the question of whether or not this influence is ultimately favorable or 
detrimental to the IDF. In Rosman-Stollman‟s research, partly covered in her Israel 
Studies journal article “Women of Valor: The Garin Program and the Israel Defense 
Forces,” Rosman-Stollman sheds light on religious female Jewish soldiers who elected to 
take part in the program, an initiative that merges religious-oriented studies and army 
service, often through participation in the military‟s education unit.   
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 As Rosman-Stollman explains, the Garin program functions as a „mediating 
mechanism,‟ an aid of sorts to religious students as they complete their army service. The 
Garin program serves as a link between its members, the army and the religious 
community. Interestingly, despite demands for army exemptions on the basis of religious 
observance and conscientious objection, a rather high percentage – thirty percent - of 
female religious high school graduates in Israel complete army service. Nearly all 
remaining female religious Jews become involved in volunteer work for National Service 
as opposed to pursuing the traditional track of service in the IDF. The option – taken 
advantage of by roughly sixty nine percent of young religious Jewish women – is deemed 
more fitting by the religious Zionist camp in Israel as it prevents devout young adults 
from exposure to aspects of army life that would clash with their lifestyle, such as living 
in close quarters with their male counterparts. While the most observant of religious Jews 
are against military involvement in any form for women, some types of army positions 
are regarded as more respectable than others. For example, in the case of a woman who 
feels strongly about serving in the army, her rabbinic guides may urge her to complete 
service in the IDF through participation in the education sector so that she will work 
alongside other religious women and keep her religious convictions and practices intact. 
 Rosman-Stollman powerfully conveys the importance of the Garin program to the 
IDF as a whole. Although the program enrolls few students, the IDF has worked to make 
sure the program continues, clearly an indication of the army‟s interest in catering to 
smaller groups within the larger force. The scholar portrays the Garin program as a 
benign component of the lives of religious Jewish women who choose to serve in the 
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IDF; while members attend religious-themed courses, the midrashot primarily serve to 
monitor their students‟ mental and physical well-being (Rosman-Stollman, 160).
 Rosman-Stollman demonstrates that the army is subservient, to an extent, to the 
mandates of the Garin program; officers are required to relieve religious soldiers of 
military responsibilities so that they may take advantage of Garin program courses. Not 
only are devout soldiers entitled to attend these classes in lieu of completing traditional 
army tasks, but Rosman-Stollman claims a number of observant soldiers have found the 
religious-oriented instruction to be an integral component of army life. As the scholar 
explains, the courses and Garin program-led monthly meetings offer religious troops 
much-needed intellectual stimulation and the opportunity for exposure to subjects outside 
of army domain – amenities that are not afforded to secular soldiers (Rosman-Stollman, 
163).            
 Rosman-Stollman makes it clear that the influence of the midrashot cannot be 
underestimated. To some degree, these schools affect military judgments that concern 
their students. The scholar claims that midrashot inadvertently mold the army experience 
for its soldiers. As described in “Women of Valor,” the midrashot exert influence not 
only by actively intervening in students‟ affairs and mediating in situations where devout 
conscripts feel torn between fulfilling army obligations and meeting the demands placed 
on them by religious leaders; the potential of midrashot to be called on by students to 
mediate is arguably more significant. Rosman-Stollman also argues that the midrashot 
function, intentionally or not, as a de-stressor of sorts. Since students begin their service 
together in preparatory courses, their entry into the army is not as challenging as it is for 
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secular troops (Rosman-Stollman, 165).     
 Interestingly, Rosman-Stollman acknowledges that participation in the Garin 
program often leads to unintentional, negative outcomes. Student members have found 
that despite the advantages of taking part in the midrashot, fellow participants often 
harbor attitudes that are not conducive to furthering army aims. As Rosman-Stollman 
explains, midrashot students may feel that, through the assistance of the Garin program, 
they can change a particular course of events in their favor which, in the long-term, may 
endanger the army (Rosman-Stollman, 166). This attitude has led students to become 
self-absorbed to some extent, often showing a lack of respect for the officers under whose 
authority they serve.         
 Yet Rosman-Stollman makes an equally compelling case in defense of the 
midrashot and counters those who hone in on its flaws. The majority of the students who 
take part in the Garin program are graduates of rigorous high schools; as a consequence 
of their academic background, they tend to be articulate and uninhibited when it comes to 
raising questions and expressing their opinions. Garin program members may initially 
find it challenging to understand IDF-related situations from the perspective of an officer 
since the civilian perspective has been ingrained in them. Yet at the same time, students 
in the program have brought a greater degree of creativity to their work in the army and 
have proven more adept at taking on new demands and managing on their own with 
minimal supervision. Despite the setbacks that their background may bring to the table, 
midrashot students have turned into strong soldiers and, in particular, have become 
effective teachers in the army‟s education sector (Rosman-Stollman, 167). Students who 
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took part in the midrashot found that their participation in the program better equipped 
them for the rigors of army life and ensured that they would be prepared to serve.  
 Rosman-Stollman argues that while there are numerous advantages to taking part 
in the Garin program, the benefits are primarily “practical and psychological in nature” 
(Rosman-Stollman, 167). The program offers students the chance to work in the 
education unit and, in a general sense, receive guidance as they complete a year of study 
and service. Students who have gone through the Garin program have reported that their 
participation in the program not only strengthened their religious identities, but also 
afforded them a period of time to re-evaluate what is important to them. Many students 
have found that this time was well spent, as it psychologically geared them up for army 
service (Rosman-Stollman, 168).      
 Rosman-Stollman claims that including religious soldiers in the army through 
simultaneous enrollment in the midrashot benefits not only the devout troops themselves 
but also the IDF at large. Interestingly, secular officers have their own motives for 
recruiting religious soldiers; many see the move as a necessary step to ensure that the IDF 
remains a „people‟s army‟ (Rosman-Stollman, 170). Since religious soldiers have proven 
to be an asset to the entire force, the IDF has been willing to accommodate its devout 
conscripts and accept some degree of religious intervention. As Rosman-Stollman 
phrased it, the IDF has found that “the benefits from the [Garin] program balance its 
costs” (Rosman-Stollman, 172).  
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While mediating structures have become a presence in the Israeli army and 
their accomplishments should not be overlooked, their efforts are a mere beginning. 
Despite the constructive intentions of the Garin program, midrashot and similar 
programs, none of these initiatives has done enough to fully integrate religious 
soldiers into the fabric of army life. 
Aryeh Newman‟s brief analysis of the experience of devout troops serving 
alongside their secular counterparts contains a number of sweeping generalizations that 
are not followed by statistics to strengthen his arguments, nor does he identify particular 
soldiers who share the sentiments he claims they have expressed.   
 Newman, a former scholar at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, sheds light on 
how religious soldiers feel at the start of their service when they begin serving alongside 
less observant troops but implies that all devout conscripts are bound to have the same 
experience serving in the army simply because of their degree of adherence to religious 
tradition. The scholar writes that, “when the observant civilian enters the armed forces, 
there is no doubt that he feels his remoteness and the difficulties of his position as a 
practicing Jew” (Newman, 28).       
 Perhaps there are some underlying similarities in the army service of religious 
soldiers, but Newman simply cannot speak with certainty for them all. In addition, while 
religious recruits may constitute a minority in the armed forces and may serve under the 
authority of secular officials, one cannot assume that these non-religious officers are 
inevitably un-sympathetic toward their troops‟ desire to remain practicing Jews, and 
observant soldiers are not doomed to an isolating experience in the army simply because 
most of their fellow soldiers are not nearly as religious. Newman claims that unless 
religious soldiers decide to join Nachal, an exclusively religious agricultural unit formed 
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by the army that combines farming and military service, devout conscripts are “isolated 
and on the defensive” (Newman, 28). The scholar claims that while the creation of 
Nachal marks an effort to give observant soldiers the opportunity to serve without 
compromising their religious practices and the unit is afforded special privileges such as 
time devoted specifically for prayer and religious studies, its significance is otherwise 
limited. The few soldiers who take advantage of this program are hardly of great 
importance and the unit retains a symbolic meaning at best.    
 Not only is Nachal just one example of a mediating structure designed to ease the 
transition into army life for observant troops and ensure that religious soldiers can serve 
Israel and abide by religious standards at the same time, but Nachal has grown from a 
small group of thirty soldiers into a unit of nearly one thousand troops. In fact, Nachal 
aspires to become a high functioning infantry brigade and continues to expand its 
programs to meet the religious and military needs of Israel‟s increasingly pious 
community.          
 Newman also fails to address the accomplishments of the Garin program, 
midrashot and similar initiatives that assist religious troops in completing their army 
service without having to forfeit religious obligations. Given the fact that such programs 
have already been established and have achieved notable success, it is suspect that the 
hypothetical soldier Newman writes of is destined for an isolating experience in the army. 
Newman acknowledges that the accomplishments of the Military Rabbinate in providing 
some semblance of a religious environment for devout soldiers are noble efforts not to be 
disparaged, yet maintains that “this type of activity stops short of any striking 
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manifestations of Jewishness in the broadest sense” (Newman, 29). Perhaps Newman‟s 
criticisms have some merit, and efforts already undertaken to make army bases religious-
friendly are only a first step, yet Newman‟s failure to propose satisfactory additional 
measures the Military Rabbinate could consider to accommodate devout soldiers 


















Chapter 3: Haredi involvement in the work of ZAKA can be regarded as a 
mediating mechanism. The organization has afforded the Haredi community the 
opportunity to serve Israel in accordance with – not against - its members’ religious 
beliefs. 
As Eyal Ben-Ari‟s name is bound to surface in an analysis of the extent to which 
religion has influenced the nature and conduct of Israeli military operations, the 
professor‟s collaborative work with fellow scholars of similar interests is particularly 
important to examine. In conjunction with Nurit Stadler and Einat Mesterman, both of 
whom are also based at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, Ben-Ari has conducted a 
comprehensive analysis of ZAKA, the Ultra-Orthodox Identification Teams for Victims 
of Disasters in Israel, in an effort to address their collective interest in religion and 
military affairs. At the outset of their research, the scholars acknowledge that despite 
numerous instances of terrorist activity that plague the Middle East as a whole, only 
recently have organizations sprung up to respond to the aftermath of terrorist activities.  
 ZAKA has distinguished itself in Israel as a relatively new religious-oriented 
organization. The group‟s importance to Israeli society cannot be overemphasized given 
the increase in terrorism in Israel in the last decade; in fact, the surge in terrorist activity 
has been particularly sharp since the beginning of the Al-Aqsa Intifada (Ben Ari, 623). 
True to the nature of the organization, the several hundred all male ZAKA volunteers are 
drawn almost entirely from the most devout of Israel‟s religious groups – the Haredi 
community. The agency‟s makeup alone differentiates it from other organizations with 
similar missions; as the scholars explain, members of Israel‟s ultra-Orthodox community 
are often fierce opponents of „modernity and national duties‟ (Ben-Ari, 624). As it 
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addresses both the tragic aftermath of war and the religious practices that inevitably 
become involved when handling the deceased, ZAKA has come to focus on properly 
caring for victims of terrorist activity and ensuring that all casualties receive a Jewish 
burial. As the scholars describe, “the handling of terror victims was linked to a religious 
act seen to be especially significant in terms of the Jewish theology of death, burial and 
salvation” (Ben-Ari, 624). While the organization has remained true to its original ideals, 
it has since expanded its services and now provides medical assistance and support for 
both survivors of terrorist attacks and the families of terror victims.    
 Interestingly, this type of work, carried out in response to the devastation brought 
about by terrorism, is sanctioned by the religious leadership. As a religious-oriented 
service organization,  ZAKA functions under the supervision of a number of rabbis who 
offer „spiritual guidance‟ and make decisions regarding treatment of the deceased and 
meeting Jewish standards of purity. As the scholars point out, it is crucial to note that 
these religious leaders provide „theological justifications for the organization through the 
use of traditional Jewish sources‟ (Ben-Ari, 630). Yet in the event that devout ZAKA 
volunteers are called to work on the Sabbath, the violation of religious dictates was 
deemed acceptable – a negligible infringement – in light of „the importance of saving the 
lives of innocent civilians‟ (Ben-Ari, 630-631). As the scholars have emphasized, Haredi 
ZAKA volunteers have, for the most part, been able to serve the organization without 
compromising cherished religious values. In fact, a number of Orthodox ZAKA service 
workers claim that the need to show respect toward the deceased and honor those who 
have perished, which the religious describe as kavod hamet, is regarded as „a 
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commandment of greatest value‟ (Ben-Ari, 631). In fact, proceeding with a proper Jewish 
burial immediately following a person‟s death – one that meets religiously-dictated 
standards - is regarded as a great mitzvah, or good deed, one so important that it 
legitimizes a break from Torah study and violating the Sabbath (Ben-Ari, 632).  
 As the scholars concisely put it, despite the undeniable importance of religious 
convictions to devout ZAKA volunteers, “if a controversial religious dilemma appears, it 
is likely that it will eventually be religiously approved if it serves the purposes and goals 
laid out by the organization” (Ben-Ari, 631). During the organization‟s early years, rabbis 
allowed only limited relief work to be conducted on the Sabbath, and the agency‟s 
operations on high holidays were restricted to treating and reviving the injured. Yet 
eventually, following a rise in terrorist activity in Israel, the religious leadership relaxed 
its regulations and permitted the removal and handling of the deceased (Ben-Ari, 631). 
 While the task of treating survivors of terrorist activity is considered the domain 
of state institutions, many Jewish Israelis regard carrying out the mission of ZAKA as “a 
central religious duty” (Ben-Ari, 624). As religious ZAKA volunteers go about handling 
the remains of individuals who perished in acts of terror, they regard the process as not 
only beneficial to terror victims; carrying out this line of work is in service to what these 
devout workers understand to be hesed shel emet, or true kindness, regarded as “the 
ultimate act of generosity” since reciprocating this display of compassion cannot be 
expected. In their publication, Ben-Ari and his colleagues quote a ZAKA volunteer who 
cited his motivation for becoming involved with the agency: “You can contribute as a 
person … this is a real measure of kindness because the person cannot say thank you 
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back to you. So it‟s not that I do a favor for someone and then expect a thank you in 
return. It is to know that a person that has been killed in a terror attack and his body is 
dispersed all over, will at least get the respect owed to him and be buried the Jewish way 
like every one of us would like” (Ben-Ari, 633). Another ZAKA volunteer reported 
similar sentiments and claimed that respecting and honoring those who have perished is 
synonymous with true kindness since “you cannot expect the dead person to give you 
something in return.” Echoing the opinions of fellow volunteers, “there is nothing holier 
than a proper Jewish burial” (Ben-Ari, 633).        
 Fulfilling this obligation requires religious ZAKA volunteers to serve in public, 
be available for work at any time and disregard their commitments to the yeshivot and 
their community as a whole (Ben-Ari, 629). Not surprisingly, since involvement in 
ZAKA missions entails a considerable degree of commitment and sacrifice on the part of 
Haredi volunteers, particularly since it calls for them to prioritize service to the 
organization over attending to religious studies, Haredi men who become ZAKA 
volunteers often exhibit some degree of distance from fellow Haredim who oppose 
military involvement, demonstrating that there are vast differences of opinion even within 
the Haredi community. Refraining from army service became quite common among 
Haredi men, so the minority who chose to go ahead with army service despite the 
unpopularity of the decision were regarded by fellow Haredim as men who could not 
excel in a religious, academic setting.       
 While a number of Haredim are against even the sector of the army created with 
their interests and needs in mind, other Haredim, primarily younger ones, concede the 
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importance of completing army service and helping to defend Israel‟s borders. The 
organization‟s religious volunteers are remarkably more modern than Haredim who are 
not affiliated with the agency, more inclined to be politically involved and a number of 
them have served, albeit for a short time, in the Israeli army (Ben-Ari, 630).  
 It is interesting to note the dramatic change in the Haredi view toward ZAKA. 
When the organization was established, a number of prominent Orthodox rabbis of the 
time objected to it and maintained that the agency symbolized „heresy and sin‟ (Ben-Ari, 
624). These religious leaders argued that Haredim are obliged to devote themselves to 
Torah study, and any interruption to fulfilling this requirement was deemed sinful (Ben-
Ari, 627). Rabbis were particularly concerned that exposure to non-Haredi volunteers and 
victims in public could potentially threaten Haredi culture. The religious leadership often 
countered claims that it was state-dependent and had yet to make a substantive 
contribution to Israeli society by claiming that the Torah is “the primary path within an 
ascetic life” that, consequently, allows “withdrawal from the material world” (Ben-Ari, 
627). In effect, the nation‟s most devout residents, along with the leaders of their 
communities, cited this argument to justify their exemption from army service and other 
responsibilities to the state.          
Through functioning as a mediating mechanism, ZAKA has, to some extent, 
improved relations between Israel’s Haredi and secular communities. 
As the Intifada turned into a protracted conflict, it prompted more Haredim to 
become ZAKA volunteers. In fact, Haredi participation in ZAKA, an organization that 
has become established and highly-regarded in Israeli society, has had the unintended 
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consequence of shedding a more positive light on the nation‟s religious community. 
While many secular Israelis are known to resent the nation‟s devout residents and claim 
that the religious community accepts the benefits of citizenship without assuming the 
responsibilities, Haredi involvement in ZAKA initiatives has helped to allay concerns 
among secular Israelis that their religious neighbors are a societal burden who do not 
contribute to the welfare of others. Haredi men who have elected to serve with ZAKA are 
regarded as “the good Haredis, participating in the first time, with social duties, problems 
facing the state in times of conflict and Israeli suffering (especially in contrast to their 
absence as soldiers in Israeli wars)” (Ben-Ari, 624-625).     
 Many religious ZAKA volunteers consider their service to the agency to be a 
fitting alternative to army service yet every bit as valuable to the state. The scholars 
imply that this claim is not without merit; in their publication, the researchers note that 
“Heroic stories disseminated within the organization … bear remarkable similarity to 
such accounts found in and around the Israeli military” (Ben-Ari, 637). Not only does 
their service to ZAKA clearly stand to benefit the individuals that the organization aims 
to help, primarily terror survivors and their families, but as the organization‟s Haredi 
volunteers assist those affected by terrorism, they are simultaneously accomplishing a 
mission that Orthodox rabbis regard as „sacred work.‟     
 The authors argue that ZAKA‟s actions are justified since the organization‟s 
practices are, as the scholars phrase it, “grounded in Jewish traditions” (Ben-Ari, 620). 
As Ben-Ari and his colleagues explain, ZAKA has used this element to its advantage in 
order to treat victims of terrorism. In other words, the work of ZAKA volunteers has been 
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deemed legitimate since it meets Talmud-specified religious requirements with regard to 
death and the ways in which the deceased are to be treated. Interestingly, as ZAKA 
carries out its work, it incorporates ideas, theories and traditions from a variety of 
institutions: the police force, army and medical organizations, among others. Despite the 
fact that ZAKA is clearly a religious-oriented group, it works closely with state agencies 
that focus on disaster relief. As the scholars make clear, this partnership has had the 
important effect of rationalizing the organization‟s actions.      
 A closer look at the nature of ZAKA makes for an interesting case study in which 
to examine the intersection of terrorism and the religious values that come into play when 
handling war‟s aftermath. It is no surprise that tackling the consequences of war 
inevitably brings to the fore varying religious practices. As the professors explain, 
responding effectively to the havoc wreaked by war demands drawing on the skills and 
expertise of a wide range of specialists: doctors, psychologists, army officers as well as 
religious leaders (Ben-Ari, 621). In short, the crux of the authors‟ argument is that 
ZAKA, along with similar organizations, not only embodies a „social response‟ to the 
devastation resulting from terrorist activities, but also serves as an influential cultural 
vehicle through which to, as the scholars put it, “produce new meanings and practices in 
the public sphere” (Ben-Ari, 621).        
 In “Terror, Aid and Organization: The Haredi Disaster Victim Identification 
Teams (ZAKA) in Israel,” Ben-Ari and his fellow researchers argue that the 
immeasurable toll of war in terms of costs incurred, supplies used and resulting casualties 
is bound to collide with religious and culturally-shaped values. As the scholars explain, 
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we tend to succumb to the notion that death is a strictly biological event, yet casualties of 
war and cultural practices are inextricably intertwined, as cultural traditions determine 
how the deceased are handled. Interestingly, the scholars distinguish between deaths 
resulting from war and deaths from other causes. As the researchers make clear, 
casualties from war warrant consideration in their own category since the deceased are 
not removed from the public eye; rather, they become the focal point of media outlets and 
images of human remains become seared in the minds of surviving civilians. Treatment 
of wartime casualties hinges on „cultural interpretations and re-interpretations‟ (Ben-Ari, 
622).           
 The effects of military-led operations also merit close attention because unlike 
natural disasters, wartime activity is perpetrated by humans, and despite the fixed period 
during which a war rages, the consequences are severe and long-term. Ben-Ari and his 
fellow researchers make an interesting and ideologically-sound argument that while 
military-initiated activity can bring about unintended casualties, the events of war afford 
scholars a valuable opportunity to tackle, as the authors put it, “basic questions about 
social organization and social life” since “during such occasions many of the social 
fissures, individual set of ties and relations and cultural assumptions about order emerge” 
(Ben-Ari, 622).         
 Ben-Ari and his colleagues distinguish their work from similar research 
conducted on the intersection of religion and terrorist activity in Israel. A number of 
scholars have studied and written extensively on the long-term consequences of war, 
social and cultural elements of terrorism, individuals who initiate such acts of violence 
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and survivors‟ coping mechanisms both at the individual and socio-cultural level. Yet the 
focus of Ben-Ari‟s research and that of his fellow scholars differentiates them from other 
academics with similar interests. Ben-Ari, Stadler and Mesterman shed light on people, 
many of whom are first aid medics, policemen, firefighters and military officers, who 
work in conjunction with other agencies to provide help to survivors of terror attacks. 
These workers treat both terror victims and survivors on the scene and are involved with 
revival efforts, removal of the deceased and helping survivors and families of victims 
cope with the shock and pain they have endured. The scholars demonstrate that this 
research focus is particularly urgent and deserving of further attention; as they mention, 
incidents of terrorism have surfaced across the globe – in the United States, throughout 
Europe and Asia as well as in Israel. In light of this reality, the scarcity of scholarship on 
the subject is a red flag and the need for further research in this area cannot be 
overlooked.           
 The creation of ZAKA and the firm place it has secured in Israeli society, as well 
as its incorporation of the Haredi community – a move that has powerfully prompted 
secular Israelis to dispel popular stereotypes of the state-reliant religious – is certainly 
noteworthy. The authors mention that since the agency‟s founding in 1995, its 
accomplishments have been quite impressive given its young age. ZAKA volunteers are 
often the first to attend to victims of terror and have been credited with carrying out a 
number of successful resuscitations (Ben-Ari, 629). The organization‟s “capacity to 
provide creative and immediate responses to dynamic terror conditions has strongly 
reinforced its legitimacy and power not only in the eyes of the Haredi public but also 
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within society at large” (Ben-Ari, 645). Yet it should come as no surprise that an 
organization like ZAKA has developed and become a success story. As Ben-Ari and his 
fellow researchers note in their Anthropological Quarterly article, religious movements 
in Israel have developed remarkably over the last sixty years (Ben-Ari, 626).   
 It is worth mentioning that for all the success it has achieved in Israel, ZAKA is 
not an entirely new organization. As Ben-Ari and his colleagues explain, “its institutional 
and cultural roots are embedded in Haredi culture and in the community‟s many 
charitable, nonprofit social services and educational networks” (Ben-Ari, 633). Haredim 
have always regarded the services carried out by ZAKA as a core component of their 
community. As the scholars aptly put it, this line of work is “anchored in Jewish values.”  
 Yet Ben-Ari and his co-authors are quick to note crucial distinctions that 
powerfully set apart ZAKA from other Haredi organizations with overlapping objectives. 
As they aptly put it, “ZAKA has a unique role to play that differs substantially from that 
played by the other organizations that operate in the wake of [terror] attacks” (Ben-Ari, 
644). The scholars make clear that, unlike similar agencies, ZAKA operates in the public 
eye and aims to meet the needs and ensure the security of all Israeli citizens, including 
Israeli Arabs. It is perhaps this organizational feature that is most striking, yet ZAKA has 
distinguished itself from similar agencies in a slew of other ways as well; for instance, 
not only has the agency come to specialize in death and become renowned for its 
willingness to collaborate with state institutions, but its volunteers operate against a 
backdrop of increasing terrorist activity worldwide. ZAKA has achieved a high degree of 
success in Israel since it has proven capable of rapidly mobilizing volunteers, assigning 
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them varying tasks depending on their skills, collaborating with other institutions and 
restoring normalcy following a terrorist attack (Ben-Ari, 635).     
 It is also interesting to juxtapose the Haredi ZAKA volunteers‟ outlook alongside 
that of many secular Jews who charge that the relationship between Haredim and the 
Israeli government is akin to that of a parasite on a host – a mere burden on the larger 
community that must shoulder the costs. As Ben-Ari and his colleagues describe, ZAKA 
volunteers maintain that their actions are motivated by their religious convictions and 
powerfully demonstrate their dedication to ensuring the well-being of others. This 
position suggests that the Haredim display feelings of social responsibility – a sentiment 
many of Israel‟s secular citizens perhaps had not realized in a community known to evade 
fulfilling obligations to the state (Ben-Ari, 635).      










Chapter 4: Rabbinical influence on soldiers is on the rise, yet this does not 
undermine the effectiveness of military operations. Religious Zionists may object to 
disengagement yet simultaneously serve the State of Israel. 
Though her scholarship does not specifically address the evolving position of 
Haredim in Israeli society, Etta Bick has similarly investigated the close link between 
religion and politics in Israel and the undeniable influence of the religious leadership on 
the morale and conduct of the IDF. Based at the College of Judea and Samaria in Israel, 
Bick has sought answers to her research interests with a focus strikingly similar to that of 
Yagil Levy. Like Levy, Bick also covered the summer 2005 disengagement process that 
entailed Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Disengagement led to the demolition of 
twenty one settlements in Gaza as well as four settlements in Northern Samaria, which 
had been home to approximately ten thousand Israelis. The army had been charged with 
the task of removing the settlers and destroying the settlements (Bick, 306). Prime 
Minister Ariel Sharon had called for disengagement in an effort to address Israel‟s 
demographic problems and ensure that a Jewish majority in Israel would be sustained 
(Bick, 308).          
 As is the case with any proposed government policy, the terms of disengagement 
were bound to be polarizing. Religious Zionists, in particular, vehemently opposed the 
initiative yet were ultimately unsuccessful in demonstrating against it. While Bick 
acknowledges the value of previous literature – which has concentrated primarily on 
relations between religious authorities and state institutions in Israel as well as changes in 
the structure of Israel‟s political parties – the scholar focuses on the tense relationship 
between Israel‟s religious and secular communities. As Bick explains, Israel‟s devout and 
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secular camps became increasingly confrontational with one another in the 1990‟s, and 
she attributes the decline in religious-secular relations to the influential role of the ultra-
Orthodox in the formation of political alliances (Bick, 307).    
 As the scholar makes clear, the religious leadership was particularly outspoken in 
its condemnation of the proposal to proceed with plans of disengagement. In fact, many 
ultra- Orthodox rabbis led the opposition to the withdrawal and attempted to take 
advantage of their position of power, albeit in the religious realm, and use their authority 
to achieve favorable political and military outcomes. As both Bick and Levy mention, 
some vocal rabbis went so far as to issue halakhic decrees that urged soldiers to refrain 
from carrying out the evacuation (Bick, 307). In short, despite clear similarities in 
research interests, Bick‟s studies, as covered in “Rabbis and Rulings: Insubordination in 
the Military and Israeli Democracy,” primarily address the rulings of well-known rabbis 
on issues of noncompliance in the army, the political significance of these decrees and 
their potential long-term consequences for the nation‟s religious community and for 
Israeli democracy as a whole (Bick, 307).      
 At the outset, Bick simply states the undeniable truth: rabbis have assumed an 
increasingly prominent presence in Israeli society and have had a mounting effect on the 
politics of Israel‟s religious Zionist community and on the National Religious Party 
(Bick, 307). In other  words, the rabbinic leadership has built on its authority in the 
religious sphere and extended its influence into the political arena. In doing so, they have 
voiced their opinions on public policies and have encouraged followers to vote for certain 
candidates over others. Perhaps most important, the religious authorities have historically 
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been active within their communities in efforts to further expand and strengthen their 
allegiance to the state and its various agencies. As Bick aptly put it, the religious Zionist 
community‟s support for the Israeli government and its interest in working with secular 
politicians has been „unqualified‟ and has been conducive to enforcing both „state 
legitimacy and service to it‟ (Bick, 308). Along with Levy, Bick also contends that there 
has been a dramatic rise in religious studies undertaken by devout young adults, and more 
and more of them are ascribing greater importance to abiding by Halakha and 
maintaining close proximity to religious authorities for rabbinic consultations.   
 In the context of disengagement, religious Zionists objected not only on political 
grounds but also on account of religious reasons – parting with a section of Israel (Bick, 
308). In light of this element of Prime Minister Sharon‟s initiative, many rabbis saw no 
other option than to speak out on the issue and become involved in political debate. 
Given the complex situation that gave way to Sharon‟s proposal, the announcement to 
disengage and the reactions it provoked on the part of soldiers, rabbis and civilians 
combined to create an unsettling stir in Israeli society.     
 To be expected, the call for disengagement, polarizing as it was, makes for a 
fascinating case study. As Bick explains, Israel faced a difficult theoretical dilemma: it 
could not simultaneously retain its democratic elements and continue to occupy the 
territories without granting political rights to Palestinians. Yet the situation was 
aggravated by the fact that Israel also sought to remain a Jewish state. In keeping with its 
objective to ensure that Israel would not shed its Jewish character, Israel could not further 
integrate Palestinians without running the risk of jeopardizing Israel‟s „Jewish majority 
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and national character‟ (Bick, 308).      
 Despite eliciting protest and accepting the possibility of civil disobedience, 
Sharon publicly defended the plan to disengage, arguing that removing the  Israeli 
presence in Gaza would take pressure off of Israeli soldiers to guard the settlements and 
would ultimately bolster Israel‟s position in the international arena. Proceeding with 
disengagement would allow Israel to determine its own borders and avoid having national 
boundaries drawn by the Palestinian authorities. Rather than consider it a rash 
concession, Sharon urged Israelis to see the plan as one that would successfully protect 
Israel‟s interests (Bick, 308). Most Israelis reported in a number of polls taken at the time 
that they accepted the government‟s plan to withdraw from the Gaza Strip in an effort to 
make strides toward peace.         
 Yet despite earning the approval of the majority of Israeli voters to disengage 
from Gaza and Northern Samaria, the proposal shocked settlers and members of the 
National Religious Party. In fact, critics of the plan organized massive protests and 
solicited like-minded volunteers to convey to politicians that proceeding with 
disengagement would put the safety of Israelis on the line.    
 The issue of disengagement is a classic case in which religious beliefs and army 
demands collide. As Bick makes clear, the government‟s order for IDF soldiers to carry 
out the evacuation was problematic for troops who were against the initiative, and this 
bind was particularly pronounced for those from the religious Zionist camp (Bick, 309). 
Not surprisingly, devout soldiers found it more difficult than did their secular troops to 
proceed with disengagement since many of them either had friends or family members in 
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Gaza and, in contrast to most secular Israelis who hardly ever paid visits to Gaza and do 
not have much of a relationship with settlement residents, many religious Zionist soldiers 
had strong connections to settlers in the Gaza Strip and Northern Samaria.    
 Not only were devout soldiers motivated by their personal and familial relations 
to oppose disengagement, but in the larger picture, their principles clashed with what they 
were being commanded to do. The large majority of religious Zionists supported the 
settler movement and believed that land conquered during the 1967 war constituted a 
core part of Israel. These devout troops also strongly opposed granting land to 
Palestinians. As Bick describes, religious soldiers were personally conflicted when 
commanded to evacuate settlers in Gaza and Northern Samaria because the situation 
raised questions regarding the strength of their allegiances; in other words, would they 
ascribe greater value to heeding state interests or Halakhic law? (Bick, 310). Bick gives 
the question a sense of urgency; weighing the importance of abiding by military orders in 
the service of state interests against personal ideologies has great bearing on the 
cohesiveness of the IDF. The issue is all the more pressing for the military given its 
makeup; thousands of religious Zionists serve in the army and a number of them have 
taken on senior positions within the force. 
It is important to examine the prospect of disengagement from the 
perspective of the army as well as the religious establishment. 
Though the connection between religious recruits and the military at large was 
akin to a contract beneficial to both sides, the nature of this contract turned out to be far 
more complicated – and far less advantageous – for observant soldiers, and this reality 
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came to light during the period of disengagement. Though the participation of devout 
conscripts had been construed as a benefit for them, this element did not pan out; in fact, 
disengagement posed a threat to them. Since army service was not ultimately helpful to 
religious soldiers, the contract relationship with religious soldiers could no longer be 
upheld. In essence, the army was faced with the task of having to proceed with an order 
that clashed with the convictions of many of its own soldiers. Not surprisingly, these 
soldiers were influenced by the sentiments of their rabbis, many of whom maintained that 
religious laws prohibited the forced removal of Jews from their homes. A number of 
outspoken rabbis who vehemently opposed disengagement gave instructions to observant 
troops to defy army commands and refrain from participating in the displacement of 
settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.       
 Given the large number of religious soldiers already serving, the possibility of 
these servicemen falling prey to the words of their rabbinic guides was a formidable 
challenge with which the army had to contend, as it raised the possibility that many 
devout soldiers would refuse to proceed with disengagement and claim conscientious 
objection as their justification. Levy notes that the risk was real; hundreds of soldiers 
affirmed their plans to act in accordance with the wishes of their rabbis. Such a stance 
would severely weaken the army‟s ability to successfully carry out the disengagement 
plan. Not only does Levy argue that religious soldiers put army unity at risk, but the 
scholar maintains that the threat they posed to the army as a whole far exceeded the 
threats posed by other segments of the army (Levy, 393).     
 As Levy explains, rabbis who were vocal during the time of disengagement 
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ultimately gained a „foothold‟ in the army to an unprecedented degree (Levy, 395). Their 
influence on the nature and course of army conduct was far-reaching; they assumed the 
authority to negotiate with officers on the conditions under which religious recruits would 
serve, created the hesder  schools for religious soldiers and sought to ensure that the army 
would accept the tendency of rabbis to put forth religious decisions on secular issues and 
consider military actions in light of religious considerations (Levy, 394-395).   
 It is noteworthy to mention that while the involvement of religious troops in 
military operations posed challenges to army commanders, devout conscripts also faced 
problems of their own (Levy, 398). On the one hand, heeding the instructions of their 
rabbinic guides to refuse to carry out disengagement would have relieved them, as this 
plan of action would have been in line with their personal convictions, yet at the same 
time, their defiance may ultimately be detrimental to their standing in the army. 
Interestingly, tarnishing the status of the army – the apolitical, „people‟s‟ army – may 
also bring about unintended negative consequences for religious troops; doing so may 
have reduced the influence of a national icon and hindered military efforts to successfully 
complete army operations, which were deemed critically important by Zionist-leaning, 
religious rabbis (Levy, 398). In essence, soldiers‟ noncompliance would challenge the 
power of the IDF, which necessarily meant disparaging the importance of the religious 
sector of the army.         
 Not only would a display of soldier disobedience undermine their own standing in 
the army; it would have also put their accomplishments on the line, many of which were 
achieved over the last thirty years (Levy, 399). Perhaps more importantly, their 
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insubordination may prompt army officers to cast doubt on the loyalty of these conscripts 
and question their commitment to achieving army goals. In light of this, refusal to carry 
out army commands would hurt the likelihood of these soldiers climbing the ranks of the 
IDF and raise the possibility that officers may become unwilling to negotiate special 
arrangements with religious leaders that accommodate the army‟s religious cohort.  
 Even more crucial, Levy argues, was the reality that since the standing of the 
army‟s religious soldiers was inextricably tied to the status of the army as a whole, 
maintaining the military as a national symbol and a people‟s army was crucially 
important, and this entailed preventing conflict between soldiers and the settlers who 
were to be evacuated as well as avoiding conscientious objection to pursuing 
disengagement (Levy, 400).        
 It is worth noting that, for all the resistance disengagement provoked among 
religious settlers and the rabbinic leadership, the devout sector did not regard it as the 
most pressing issue (Levy, 400). Interestingly, they were far more occupied by matters 
that did not loom nearly as large: weighing the costs and benefits of military service as 
opposed to Torah studies, army service potentially interfering with holiday observance, 
relations with secular soldiers, among others. Many religious troops found that, in their 
service to the army, they were perhaps compromising their relations with the religious 
leadership.          
 Not surprisingly, in an effort to mitigate religious-secular tension in the army, a 
number of IDF officers sought to exploit rabbinic influence for the army‟s benefit. While 
the military‟s secular commanders continued to negotiate with rabbis, they 
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simultaneously urged religious leaders to encourage devout recruits to comply with 
military-ordered operations (Levy, 401). Army officers even went so far as to threaten to 
close the hesderim and incorporate religious soldiers into the rest of the force should 
rabbis seek to promote conscientious objection. Along the same vein, army commanders 
took advantage of rabbinical influence to curb instances of noncompliance among 

















Conclusion: The arguments against the introduction of religious values into the 
Israeli army are plausible and worthy of consideration, yet the claims of those who 
defend religious influence as a benign – even beneficial – impact on the IDF are far 
more airtight, free of the loopholes that riddle the concerns of critics. 
  Given the widening rift between Israel‟s religious and secular communities and 
the fact that this cleavage has ramifications not only for secular army officers but for 
Israeli society as a whole, it comes as no surprise that the subject of religious influence, 
particularly on the character and unity of the Israeli military, has piqued the interest of 
numerous scholars of Israel and elicited a range of responses from them. While the issue 
is further complicated by the fact that both camps retain compelling arguments, and 
recent political developments and new scholarship demand revisiting – and perhaps 
reconstructing – previously crafted theories on the nature of religious influence on the 
army, critics of religious influence on the IDF have an inherent loophole in their stance 
for which they have yet to account: their fears of religious soldiers overpowering the 
army‟s secular majority and opting for conscientious objection as opposed to carrying out 
officer-mandated commands may have been warranted at times, particularly during the 
period of disengagement in the summer of 2005, but the fact remains that these concerns 
did not prove justified as the dreaded situations did not arise in the end. Not only was 
their apprehension unfounded, and as a result, actual causes of friction between religious 
and secular soldiers were not given sufficient attention, but critics have failed to 
appreciate the advantages of integrating religious soldiers into the force and the 
accomplishments of mediating mechanisms that have become vital to the IDF. Perhaps 
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these institutions were initially put in place to accommodate devout conscripts, but the 
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